It sounds as if Nikon was using the same private key in all their cameras… a fundamental mistake. The approach mentioned by MaHuJa (May22) using unique certified keys would be much better. Tamper evidence is also a good suggestion, though not a perfect solution, because what do you do when a camera is legitimately lost or destroyed?

While perfect security is impossible, practical security is doable. It seems like these camera companies need to hire some good outside consultants to help them do it right.

If I risk going to jail based on falsified evidence, backed by their claims, then no.

If we then go by your statement of difficulty, the correct response is not to do it at all.

However,
If each produced camera has its own key (whose certificate is signed by a master cert of theirs) and the key can’t be extracted without leaving detectable traces on the camera, then we’re starting to get somewhere. The camera itself would have to be submitted as part of the evidence. Also, the verifiers would have to say which camera s/n it was taken with, and add a disclaimer “unless that camera has been tampered with”. Which makes it near worthless if you can’t have access to the original camera. Or one can tamper with it undetectably.

By the way please make new benchmarks with new gpus from nvidia and amd(590&6990)
for password recovery tools.

Warmly regards

This is what you get for implementing your own crypto. My suggestion to both Nikon and Canon is to include an ISO-7816 ID-000 port in their cameras (more commonly known as the SIM slot in mobile phones) and support one of the well-defined standards for public key operations on smartcards (PKCS#11 for example).

This means they have far less pressure to build a robust cryptographic system as it is built-in to the many, many compliant and certified smartcards out there in the market. Instead they can concentrate on the much simpler problem of using the crypto functions properly.

The major added benefit is that customers with strict security requirements (i.e. law enforcement) don’t have to trust the crypto engines/key storage mechanisms developed by their camera supplier. They can put their own (trusted) smart-cards in the camera as simply as swapping a SIM in a mobile phone. For customers that don’t want this, they can simply trust the default smartcards supplied with the camera.

Cheers,
Ko

This means that Nikon/Canon have far less pressure to build a robust cryptographic system as it is built-in to the many, many compliant and certified smartcards out there in the market. Instead they can concentrate on the much simpler problem of implementing the crypto according to the standard.

The major added benefit is that customers with strict security requirements (i.e. law enforcement) don’t have to trust the crypto engines/key storage mechanisms developed by Nikon/Canon. They can put their own (trusted) smart-cards in the camera as simply as swapping a SIM in a mobile phone.

For customers that don’t want this, they can simply trust the default smartcards supplied by Canon/Nikon.

Customers, put pressure on them!
Cheers,
Ko

It is not possible to design a secure device at all, if the private key is stored in the device. An adversary advanced enough will have superb lab gear, including a scanning tunneling electron microscope and can sort through the integrated circuits atom by atom, if necessary. The key will be retrieved eventually.

Even if that does not work, the attacker could monitor power consumption or other side channel signals to deduce the keys. It is not reasonable to except a commercial digital camera to have TEMPEST features en par with a KH-11 spy satellite!

I think photo authenticity should be provided by special digicams, which also shoot a 135mm common film frame, in addition to the higher quality CCD/CMOS digital image. Chemical based roll film megative contains an almost infinite amount of information, so experts could you use it determine or exclude fakery.

Kind regards, Tamas.

BTW I saw on Canon site a small advisory for owners to contact them, see here: http://www.canon-europe.com/Support/Consumer_Products/products/cameras/Accessories_Battery_Grips_etc/OSK-E3.aspx?type=important&faqtcmuri=tcm:13-812833

So I think you should update your pages on the canon and nikon issues to state that Canon has made a low-profile appeal to owners to contact them for more information about the vulnerability.

They continue to sell the thing with promises of security though, despite you proving it doesn’t.

Kind regards

Gareth